A close examination of the proposed Cannabis Control Commission restructuring
Last week, the Massachusetts House of Representatives voted unanimously for H.4187, a bill of cannabis policies that sends a clear message of the body’s priorities. The aspect of this bill which has most been proclaimed is the transfer of accountability for the Cannabis Control Commission (CCC) to the governor, but it has many parts. For this column, I chose to focus on the CCC restructuring proposed and what that means.
It’s also worth noting some of the bills which were discussed in this legislative session but not included in this bill. These include H.191, the proposal to limit the concentration of THC permitted in cannabis and derived products; H.193, which proposed extensive warning labels; and H.152, which would have established a large special committee to investigate anti-cannabis fearmongering. The halting of these measures demonstrates the political limits of prohibitionist forces in our state.
Ending the “independence” of the CCC
According to a popular narrative, the seeds of our current misfortune were planted in the original sin of establishing a CCC that would be “independent” of the governor. The political motivation was that former Gov. Charlie Baker, a Republican and opponent of adult-use cannabis, was in charge when the agency was established.
Currently, the treasurer appoints the CCC chair, who current law states “… shall have and exercise supervision and control over all the affairs of the commission.” This was one of three phrases identified by Rep. Dan Donahue in a July 30, 2024 memo outlining his concerns with the body’s enabling statute.
Despite holding power of appointment over the CCC’s boss, Treasurer Deb Goldberg told WGBH news in Sept. 2023, “The role of the treasurer is to appoint the chair and jointly appoint two other commissioners, but beyond that the office of the treasurer has no other authority, oversight, management, or influence over the commission.” House Speaker Ron Mariano made it clear that this restructuring is a rebuke to that abdication of oversight in a comment to State House News Service: “’It got us where we thought we had to take it away from the treasurer.”
As the Treasurer has struggled through lawsuits surrounding the ouster of former CCC Chair Shannon O’Brien, she has taken the Legislature’s blame for conditions in the CCC. As things are now, the governor and attorney general also tap commissioners, and share appointing authority for two seats with the treasurer. Have these other officials been powerless to act all this time, or did they find it more expedient to abstain from involvement while Goldberg endured the criticism?
Shrinking the roles of commissioners
H.4187 envisions a more centralized commission, with only one full-time commissioner—the chair—and two 10%-time commissioners. All of these would be appointed by the governor, with the chair serving a four-year term timed to gubernatorial elections. This means each new governor of Mass must choose a chair to run the agency at the beginning of each term, laying CCC performance at the feet of one specific leader.
At 10% time, the two “sub-commissioners” won’t be able to do much—they’ll be busy with whatever job pays their bills. Perhaps the Mass House is communicating its belief that the current five-member commission isn’t getting work done anyway, so it was time to downsize. Whatever the thinking behind this change, the result is likely to be shorter meetings. With two commissioners limited to 10% time, it is unlikely that the CCC will be able to continue meeting for six or seven hour stretches.
Other organizing language noted in Rep. Donahue’s July 30 memo included the job description for the executive director position. In the old language, “The executive director … shall be the executive and administrative head of the commission and shall be responsible for administering and enforcing the law relative to the commission and to each administrative unit thereof.” Apparently, this language was subject to misinterpretation regarding the hierarchical arrangement between the Chair and ED.
The new language spells out a more circumscribed role: “The executive director shall be the chief administrative officer of the commission and shall exercise independent authority over enforcement and the operational units of the commission.” Especially meaningful in that sentence is the term “operational units,” which defines the ED as the day-to-day manager of CCC activities.
Furthermore, under the proposed new regulations, the chair would solely appoint the ED, who would serve “under the supervision and direction of the chair,” language absent from the previous statute. Along with this more stringent directive for the ED, the new bill proposes limits for the commissioners’ activities: “Such authority shall be exercised independently of the commissioners, including the chair, who shall not participate in any fact-finding, investigative or enforcement actions that may become the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding…”
It seems sensible for commissioners to abstain from involvement in matters which they could later be called to evaluate, but commissioner-initiated fact-finding and pressure have been some of the few sources of CCC accountability to date. H.4187 would make the ED the sole conduit between commissioners and operational staff.
The Cannabis Advisory Board
While H.4187 does not make many changes to the Cannabis Advisory Board (CAB), it might envision a greater role for it. The current law lays out a 25-member board of unpaid experts to “study and make recommendations to the Massachusetts Cannabis Control Commission on the regulation and taxation of marijuana.” The CAB is under the leadership purview of the ED.
In my own experience, I presented a set of recommendations to a subcommittee of the CAB about two years ago. In that case, the body eventually voted to present my points to the commission, where they were essentially ignored amidst an outburst of political distractions. I have heard from others about similar experiences in which working with the CAB led to dead ends.
The new language leaves the CAB membership unchanged, excepting that it would be staffed exclusively by the governor and led by the CCC chair (instead of the ED). If the chair is directly involved in the work of the CAB, it might increase the odds that recommendations spur more changes. But with so much discussion of risks to the health of consumers and workers over the past two years, it is notable that the adjustments call for only one “expert in laboratory sciences and toxicology,” no advocates for workers, and no advocates for non-medical consumers.
Members of the CAB are not compensated for their time, and participation is inconsistent. An examination of the CCC calendar shows that the full CAB has often gone for several months between meetings in the past two years. Some CAB subcommittees have had similarly sporadic activity, so perhaps involvement of the CCC chair and a renewed sense of purpose will energize the board.
Vision of a streamlined commission
Finally, I’ll summarize the messages I see within the restructuring proposed in bullet points:
- One person, the governor, should hold clear accountability for the CCC. This would signal an end to the abdications of responsibility. The bill also expects the governor to spontaneously develop an interest in and understanding of Mass cannabis not previously evident.
- Meetings of the CCC should be shorter, and revolve around votes on policy and reports from the ED. There shall be no more long circular debates fueled by a lack of preparation, because two of these commissioners don’t have all day.
- The CAB should be a place for meaningful debate that is not duplicated by lesser experts within the CCC. Policy proposals should come before the commission fully formed, with their progress—from CAB to CCC—presided over by the only commissioner who really matters.
- Most aspirationally, H.4187 imagines a CCC in which investigations progress effectively and rapidly before final adjudication by the commissioners, who don’t need to spend time on fact finding and listening to the community because those actually happen in the CAB. That result, of course, will rely on whether the enhanced accountability of the ED to the commission chair improves operations so much that commissioners no longer need to poke their heads in.
In my next column, I’ll dig into the portions of the bill that deal with hemp, CBD, and beverages.
